Once Bitten, Twice Bitten: The Minnesota Court of Appeals Limits the Recovery of Sex Abuse Victims in Oelschlager v. Magnuson by McGhee, Douglas
Law & Inequality: A Journal of Theory and Practice
Volume 15 | Issue 1 Article 8
1997
Once Bitten, Twice Bitten: The Minnesota Court of
Appeals Limits the Recovery of Sex Abuse Victims
in Oelschlager v. Magnuson
Douglas McGhee
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.umn.edu/lawineq
Law & Inequality: A Journal of Theory and Practice is published by the
University of Minnesota Libraries Publishing.
Recommended Citation
Douglas McGhee, Once Bitten, Twice Bitten: The Minnesota Court of Appeals Limits the Recovery of Sex Abuse Victims in Oelschlager v.
Magnuson, 15 Law & Ineq. 191 (1997).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.umn.edu/lawineq/vol15/iss1/8
Once Bitten, Twice Bitten:
The Minnesota Court of Appeals Limits




David Oelschlager, a member of Redeemer Covenant Church
(Redeemer), was sexually abused by Redeemer pastor Albert Mag-
nuson from September 1972 until June 1982.1 Magnuson abused
Oelschlager while providing religious and emotional counseling to
him.2 In 1991, Oelschlager used Minnesota's delayed discovery
statute to file a personal injury action against Magnuson in Hen-
nepin County District Court.3 Under the theory of respondeat su-
perior, he also brought claims against Redeemer and two of its
governing bodies, the Northwest Conference of the Evangelical
Church of America and the Evangelical Covenant Church of
America.4 At trial, the jury found Magnuson liable. Redeemer
was therefore liable for Magnuson's actions under respondeat su-
perior because his actions were found to be within the scope of his
employment. 5 Redeemer appealed the decision, and the Minnesota
Court of Appeals held that respondeat superior claims are not
within the scope of Minnesota's delayed discovery statute.6 Ac-
cordingly, Oelschlager's claim against Redeemer was untimely,
and the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision.7
* J.D. expected 1997, University of Minnesota Law School. The author
wishes to thank all of the people who were instrumental in the creation of this
Comment: Sandra Conroy, Kent Klaudt and Jill Moeller for their analytical acu-
men, the board and staff of the Journal for their continuing encouragement, and
Dan Froehlich and Bill O'Brien of Miller O'Brien Bloom for suggesting this topic.
This Comment is dedicated to the memory of Max, an upstanding and well-loved
Steubener.
1. Oelschlager v. Magnuson, 528 N.W.2d 895, 897 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
2. Id.




7. Id. at 903.
Law and Inequality
Minnesota's delayed discovery statute extends the statute of
limitations for survivors of sex abuse who have repressed their
memories of the abuse. The doctrine of respondeat superior im-
putes liability to employers of tortfeasors. After the Oelschlager
decision, however, sex abuse victims who could ordinarily sue em-
ployers using both the delayed discovery statute and respondeat
superior are denied use of the doctrine. 8
This Comment reveals the infirmities in the Oelschlager
court's decision to exclude respondeat superior claims from the
scope of the delayed discovery statute. It then offers a more equi-
table answer to the Oelschlager court's concerns regarding respon-
deat superior under the delayed discovery statute than the out-
right exclusion of such claims. Part I describes the problem which
caused the Minnesota legislature to enact the delayed discovery
statute, the legislative intent behind the statute, Minnesota case
law restricting the application of the statute and the alternative
causes of action available to sex abuse victims after the Oelsch-
lager decision. Part II describes the Oelschlager decision and re-
veals its inherent problems, while Part III proposes a- more equita-
ble approach. This Comment concludes that the Oelschlager
court's exclusion of respondeat superior claims is both contrary to
the meaning and intent of the delayed discovery statute and
against public policy. As such, it should be overturned.
I. Historical Background
A. The Origins and Purpose of Minnesota's Delayed
Discovery Statute
1. Purpose of the Statute
In 1989, the Minnesota legislature enacted a law designed to
extend the time in which victims of sexual abuse could bring
claims against the parties liable for that abuse. 9 The statute pro-
vides:
Actions for damages due to sexual abuse; special provi-
sions
Subdivision 1. Definition. As used in this section, "sexual
abuse" means conduct described in sections 609.342 to
609.345.
Subd. 2. Limitations period. (a) An action for damages
based on personal injury caused by sexual abuse must be
8. Id. at 901.
9. MINN. STAT. § 541.073 (1996).
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commenced within six years of the time the plaintiff knew or
had reason to know that the injury was caused by the sexual
abuse.
(b) The plaintiff need not establish which act in a continu-
ous series of sexual abuse acts by the defendant caused the
injury.
(c) The knowledge of a parent or guardian may not be im-
puted to a minor.
(d) This section does not affect the suspension of the statute
of limitations during a period of disability under section
541.15.
Subd. 3. Applicability. This section applies to an action
for damages commenced against a person who caused the
plaintiffs personal injury either by (1) committing sexual
abuse against the plaintiff, or (2) negligently permitting sex-
ual abuse against the plaintiff to occur.10
In essence, the statute provides a victim of sexual abuse with
a six year window in which to file suit from the time that the vic-
tim knew or should have known that the sexual abuse suffered by
the victim caused the victim's injuries."
Minnesota's delayed discovery statute was enacted to assist
survivors of sexual abuse. 12 The harm endured by survivors of
sexual abuse is severe, as victims often experience feelings of guilt,
shame, depression, anxiety and low self-esteem. 13 Memories of the
abuse are often dealt with through memory repression 14 and de-
nial.I5 Alcohol abuse,' 6 suicidal ideation,17 sexual dysfunction,' 8
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Hearings on H.F. 461 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the
House Judiciary Comm. (Feb. 28, 1989); Hearings on H.F. 461 Before the House
Judiciary Comn,. (Mar. 6, 1989); Hearings on S.F. 315 Before the Criminal Law
Div. of the Senate Judiciary Comm. (Feb. 17, 1989); Hearings on S.F. 315 Before
the Senate Judiciary Comm. (Feb. 10, 1989) (available on tape at the Minnesota
Legislative Library).
13. Ann Marie Hagen, Tolling the Statute of Limitations for Adult Survivors of
Childhood Sexual Abuse, 76 IOWA L. REV. 355, 359 (1991) (arguing that both law
and policy favor allowing adult survivors of childhood sexual abuse to toll the stat-
ute of limitations when bringing suit for latent injuries).
14. Memory repression is a situation in which "victims ... forget ... events
because the feelings or meanings associated with them are unbearable." Deborah
Petersen, Recollecting Sexual Abuse Is Often a Gradual, Difficult Process; Too Hor-
rible to Renmember; Recollecting Childhood Sexual Abuse Is Like Re-collecting
Pieces of a Broken Vase: Sometimes It's Difficult to Find All the Pieces, HARTFORD
COURANT, Sept. 17, 1992, at El.
15. Denial is "accomplished by withholding conscious understanding of the
meaning and implications of what is perceived."' Rebecca L. Thomas, Adult Survi-
vors of Childhood Sexual Abuse and Statutes of Limitations: A Call For Legislative
Action, 26 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1245, 1254 n.74 (1991) (quoting Mardi J. Horow-
itz et al., A Classification Theory of Defense, in REPRESSION & DISSOCIATION 80
(Jerome L. Singer ed., 1990)).
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depression i9 and a tendency to have personal relationships with
abusive partners are common among sex abuse survivors. 20 Re-
gardless of the time of the injury or nature of the defense, the sur-
vivor loses his or her appreciation of the connection between the
sexual abuse and any resulting problems.21 Repressed or denied
memories may not, however, remain submerged forever. 22 Later
events may cause the memories of the abuse to reemerge. 23
The frequency of memory repression episodes is still a point
of contention among those who study sexual abuse. 24 In drafting
the delayed discovery statute, however, the Minnesota legislature
used the existence of memory repression as the base-line for its
debate. 25 Because the Minnesota legislature acknowledged that
memory repression exists, the academic controversy over the the-
ory's validity has no place in the debate on the delayed discovery
statute.
16. Multiple studies have shown that alcohol and drug abuse occur in ap-
proximately 20% of the survivors of sexual abuse. See, e.g., JUDITH LEWIS
HERMAN, FATHER-DAUGHTER INCEST 93, 99 (1981) (finding alcohol abuse occurring
in 20% of the incest victims studied); DAVID FINKELHOR, A SOURCEBOOK ON CHILD
SEXUAL ABUSE 162 (1981) (showing 17% of victimized women abused alcohol and
27% abused a drug in one study; in another study, 27% of the victims abused alco-
hol and 21% had a drug addiction; a third study showed 35% of victims abused
drugs and alcohol).
17. HERMAN, supra note 16, at 99.
18. See generally DIANA SULLIVAN EVERSTINE & LOUIS EVERSTINE, SEXUAL
TRAUMA IN CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS: DYNAMICS AND TREATMENT (1989)
(discussing effects of sexual abuse on children); JUDITH LEWIS HERMAN, TRAUMA
AND RECOVERY: THE AFTERMATH OF VIOLENCE-FROM DOMESTIC ABUSE TO PO-
LITICAL TERROR (1992) (discussing disorders caused by trauma and recovery there-
from); MIC HUNTER, THE SEXUALLY ABUSED MALE, VOLUME 1: PREVALENCE,
IMPACT, AND TREATMENT (1990) (discussing problems and treatment of sexual
abuse among men); ELLEN BASS & LAURA DAVIS, THE COURAGE TO HEAL: A GUIDE
FOR WOMEN SURVIVORS OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE (1988) (discussing treatment of
child sexual abuse among women).
19. Sandra Conroy, The Delayed Discovery Rule and Roe v. Archdiocese, 13
LAW & INEQ. J. 253, 256 (1995).
20. HERMAN, supra note 16, at 101.
21. Conroy, supra note 19, at 259.
22. Id. at 257-58.
23. Hagen, supra note 13, at 362-63.
24. See, e.g., Elizabeth F. Loftus et al., Memories of Childhood Sexual Abuse:
Remembering and Repressing, 18 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 67, 68 (1994) (finding mem-
ory repression in 19% of substance-abusing women who reported a history of
childhood sexual abuse); Steven N. Gold et al., Degrees of Repression of Sexual
Abuse Memories, 1994 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 441 (noting that a therapist's belief that
repressed memories exist may influence a client's determination of whether he or
she has repressed memories).
25. See generally, Hearings on S.F. 315 Before the Criminal Law Div. of the
Senate Judiciary Comm. (Feb. 17, 1989) (available on tape at the Minnesota Leg-




Debates in the Minnesota legislature on the purpose of the
statute do not contain explicit statements that the delayed discov-
ery statute is designed to encompass respondeat superior claims,
nor any statements specifically excluding the doctrine. 26 The leg-
islature recognized the potential applicability of delayed discovery
to employers, and while some legislators voiced concerns over the
broad reach of the provision, attempts to reduce the scope of the
statute failed.2 7
3. Historical Antecedent of the Minnesota Delayed
Discovery Statute
The state of Washington enacted a delayed discovery statute
for sex abuse cases one year before Minnesota. 28 The Minnesota
26. See generally tapes of legislative hearings, supra note 12.
27. Remarks made during the consideration of Minnesota Statute § 541.073
reveal the legislature's awareness of the statute's applicability to respondeat supe-
rior claims. At a meeting of the Minnesota Senate Judiciary Committee, Criminal
Law Division, Senator Roger Moe stated: "[This is a] very, very, open-ended provi-
sion ... I'm not sure what to think about it." Hearings on S.F. 315 Before the
Criminal Law Div. of the Senate Judiciary Comm. (Feb. 17, 1989) (available on
tape at the Minnesota Legislative Library, Tape 2). In the House, concerns cen-
tered on the broad reach of the delayed discovery statute were assuaged by the
idea of a "reasonableness" standard. Hearings on H.F. 461 Before the Subcomnn.
on Criminal Justice of the House Judiciary Comin. (Feb. 28, 1989) (available on
tape at the Minnesota Legislative Library, Tape 1). At a later meeting of the same
subcommittee, a suggestion was made to limit the scope of the statute by the addi-
tion of a requirement that the circumstances alleged by the victim to warrant ap-
plication of the delayed discovery statute be "reasonable." Id. This amendment
was rejected, indicating the legislature's tacit acceptance of a broad application of
the delayed discovery statute.
28. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.16.340 (West 1996). The statute states:
Actions based on childhood sexual abuse
(1) All claims or causes of action based on intentional conduct brought
by any person for recovery of damages for injury suffered as a result of
childhood sexual abuse shall be commenced within the later of the fol-
lowing periods:
(a) Within three years of the act alleged to have caused the injury or
condition;
(b) Within three years of the time the victim discovered or reasonably
should have discovered that the injury or condition was caused by said
act; or
(c) Within three years of the time the victim discovered that the act
caused the injury for which the claim is brought:
Provided, That the time limit for commencement of an action under
this section is tolled for a child until the child reaches the age of eighteen
years.
(2) The victim need not establish which act in a series of continuing
sexual abuse or exploitation incidents caused the injury complained of,
but may compute the date of discovery from the date of discovery of the
last act by the same perpetrator which is part of a common scheme or
plan of sexual abuse or exploitation.
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legislature used Washington's statute as a model when drafting its
own delayed discovery statute.29 The small number of cases inter-
preting the Washington statute do not eliminate respondeat supe-
rior as a potential cause of action under the statute. 30
The Minnesota and Washington delayed discovery statutes
are identical in all critical respects. The primary difference be-
tween the two laws is that the Minnesota statute grants victims a
cause of action against the tortfeasor and any party that negli-
gently permits the tort to occur, 31 while the Washington statute
covers "[a]ll claims or causes of action based on intentional con-
duct."3 2 Second, the Minnesota statute also eliminates some of the
redundancies in the Washington statute.3 3 A third difference is
(3) The knowledge of a custodial parent or guardian shall not be im-
puted to a person under the age of eighteen years.
(4) For purposes of this section, "child" means a person under the age
of eighteen years.
(5) As used in this section, "childhood sexual abuse" means any act
committed by the defendant against a complainant who was less than
eighteen years of age at the time of the act and which act would have been
a violation of chapter 9A.44 RCW or RCW 9.68A.040 or prior laws of
similar effect at the time the act was committed.
Id.
29. Hearings on S.F. 315 Before the Criminal Law Div. of the Senate Judiciary
Comm. (Feb. 17, 1989) (available on tape at the Minnesota Legislative Library,
Tape 2).
30. The question of whether respondeat superior applies to delayed discovery
in Washington remains open. See, e.g., Hansen v. Bremerton Sch. Dist. No. 100-C,
48 F.3d 1228, 1995 WL 74777 (9th Cir. Feb. 23, 1995) (unpublished memorandum
decision not reaching the question of whether respondeat superior applied in de-
layed discovery lawsuit). In Hansen, the plaintiff filed suit in 1992 against her
former high school gym teacher and former high school for sexual abuse which oc-
curred when she was between the ages of 15 and 18 and which ended no later than
1975. Id. at **1. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment
for the defendants on grounds that the plaintiff knew that the sexual abuse she
endured caused her injuries more than three years before she filed suit, noting
that the plaintiff had discussed the abuse in psychotherapy even while she was in
high school. Id. at **2-3. The court did not reach the school district's alternative
reason for summary judgment, that the school had not perpetrated the sexual
abuse. Id. at **2.
31. MINN. STAT. § 541.073 (1996); see text accompanying note 10 for full statu-
tory text.
32. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.16.340 (West 1996). See supra note 28 for full
statutory text.
33. The Minnesota legislature consolidated the Washington statute's options of
three years from either the date of the injury, the date of discovery of injury, or the
date of awareness that the abuse caused the injury. Hearings on S.F. 315 Before
the Criminal Law Div. of the Senate Judiciary Conlin. (Feb. 17, 1989) (available on
tape at the Minnesota Legislative Library, Tape 2). The legislature consolidated
these options into the "abuse caused the injury" standard in recognition of the fact
that the date the "abuse caused the injury" would inevitably be the last of the
three dates. Id. The other statutory provisions are substantially similar.
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that the Washington statute is limited to childhood sexual abuse, 34
while Minnesota's law extends to all instances of sexual abuse, re-
gardless of the victim's age.35 This expansion stems from the fact
that the primary impetus for the Minnesota bill came from the At-
torney General's Task Force on Violence Against Women. 36
B. Judicial Restriction of the Delayed Discovery Statute
Prior to Oelschlager
Oelschlager is one of several cases narrowing the scope of the
delayed discovery statute in Minnesota.3 7 One of its predecessors
was Roe v. Archdiocese of St. Paul.38 In Roe, the Minnesota Court
of Appeals held that once the running of the delayed discovery
statute of limitations has begun, it cannot be tolled during subse-
34. The Washington legislature took pains to ensure that only childhood sexual
abuse claims were aided by the bill:
The [Washington] legislature finds that:
(1) Childhood sexual abuse is a pervasive problem that affects the
safety and well-being of many of our citizens.
(2) Childhood sexual abuse is a traumatic experience for the victim
causing long-lasting damage.
(3) The victim of childhood sexual abuse may repress the memory of
the abuse or be unable to connect the abuse to any injury until after the
statute of limitations has run.
(4) The victim of childhood sexual abuse may be unable to understand
or make the connection between childhood sexual abuse and emotional
harm or damage until many years after the abuse occurs.
(5) Even though victims may be aware of injuries related to the child-
hood sexual abuse, more serious injuries may be discovered many years
later.
(6) The legislature enacted RCW 4.16.340 to clarify the application of
the discovery rule to childhood sexual abuse cases ....
Finding-Intent-Laws 1991, ch. 212, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.16.340 (West
1996).
In an unpublished decision, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized
the limitation of the Washington statute to claims based on childhood sexual
abuse. Mansfield v. Watson, 990 F.2d 1258, 1993 WL 74374 (9th Cir. Mar. 17,
1993). Mansfield was primarily a choice of law case, with the plaintiff arguing for
the application of Washington law so that she could take advantage of Washing-
ton's delayed discovery statute. Id. at **1. The court wrote that plaintiffs
"argument fails because Mansfield has conceded that she was over eighteen years
old when the rape occurred. By its own terms, the Washington statute of limita-
tions does not apply to her claims." Id. at **2. The court held for the defendant
before reaching the applicability of the delayed discovery statute. Id.
35. Hearings on H.F. 461 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the
House Judiciary Comm. (Feb. 28, 1989) (available on tape at the Minnesota Leg-
islative Library, Tape 1). One of the two co-chairs of that task force also sat on the
House Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, which heard the
debate on the bill. Id.
36. Id.
37. For a discussion of cases limiting the scope of the delayed discovery stat-
ute, see infra notes 38-65 and accompanying text.
38. Roe, 518 N.W.2d 629.
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quent periods of post-abuse memory repression.39 The teenaged
plaintiff in Roe alleged that a priest sexually abused her from 1982
until 1984.40 Roe attempted suicide in February 1985.41 A few
months later, she moved to Arizona in order to get away from the
priest. 42 While in Arizona, Roe repressed her memory of the
abuse. 43 She remembered nothing of the abuse until she returned
to Minnesota in August 1988. 44 She did not file suit against the
priest and the Archdiocese of St. Paul and Minneapolis until real-
izing that she was the victim of sexual abuse following a 1992 tele-
vision program. 45
The Minnesota Court of Appeals dismissed Roe's claim be-
cause, according to the court, Roe should have known prior to re-
pressing her experience that "[her] injuries were caused by sexual
abuse."46 The court noted that periods of memory repression sub-
sequent to actual knowledge of the abuse are insufficient to sus-
pend the continued running of the statute of limitations.47
Roe limited the usefulness of the delayed discovery statute to
victims of sex abuse by holding that in order to fit within the stat-
ute, repression must occur during the abuse. 48 Under the Roe
standard, repression that occurs after the abuse ends constitutes
"subsequent" memory repression, which does not toll the statute of
limitations. The Roe standard precludes the use of the delayed
discovery statute to any sex abuse victim who has repressed his or
her memories of the abuse after the abuse is over.
The Minnesota Supreme Court gave the delayed discovery
statute an even more restrictive reading in Blackowiak v. Kemp.49
Blackowiak was eleven years old when he was allegedly abused by
his high school guidance counselor. 50 Blackowiak further alleged
the existence of other abusive episodes, the details of which he
39. Id. at 632.
40. Id. at 630-31.
41. Id. at 630.
42. Id. at 631.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. The television program discussed sexual misconduct by members of the
clergy. Id.
46. Id. at 630.
47. Id. at 633. Judge Amundson noted in his concurring opinion in Roe that
eliminating subsequent repression renders delayed discovery almost useless. Id.
at 633 (Admunson, J., concurring). See generally Conroy, supra note 19
(discussing the limitations imposed by Roe on delayed discovery litigation).
48. Conroy, supra note 19, at 266.
49. 546 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 1996).
50. Id. at 2.
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could not recall due to traumatic amnesia. 5' The Minnesota Su-
preme Court concluded that Blackowiak knew he was sexually
abused prior to 1986, the earliest year in which he could file suit
under the delayed discovery statute. 52 The basis for this decision
was that Blackowiak knew his guidance counselor was doing
something "wrong" to him.53 As a result, he "freaked out" when,
eleven years after the abuse, he saw Kemp in the company of an-
other young boy. Therefore, he never completely repressed his
memory of the abuse.54 Until 1991, however, Blackowiak did not
discuss the abuse with a therapist or connect the abuse with his
subsequent injuries, which included drug abuse and psychological
problems resulting in a propensity to engage in criminal activity. 55
Blackowiak finally established the connection between the abuse
and his injuries in 1991 when a close friend informed him of the
causal link between sexual abuse and the injuries Blackowiak sus-
tained.56
In overturning the trial court's summary judgment order for
the defendants, the Minnesota Court of Appeals held that the evi-
dence "did not conclusively establish that the plaintiff knew or
should have known prior to 1986 that the defendant's sexual abuse
caused his psychological injuries."57
The Minnesota Supreme Court overturned the Court of Ap-
peals' decision in a holding that went far beyond finding that the
evidence was insufficient to establish causation.58 Relying on a
criminal sexual conduct case from 1982, 59 the Minnesota Supreme
Court held that, since "the nature of criminal sexual conduct is
such that an intention to inflict injury can be inferred as a matter
of law,"60 a victim is injured if he or she is sexually abused.61 Ac-
cordingly, the delayed discovery statute of limitations begins to
run as soon as the abuse occurs.62 In the view of the Blackowiak
51. Id.
52. Id. at 3.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 2.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. (citing Blackowiak v. Kemp, 528 N.W.2d 247 (IMinn. Ct. App. 1995)).
58. Id.
59. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Hill, 314 N.W.2d 834 (Minn. 1982).
60. Blackowiak v. Kemp, 546 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Minn. 1996).
61. Id.
62. See Gibbons v. Krowech, No. C4-95-2435, 1996 WL 422513, at *2 (Minn. Ct.
App. July 30, 1996) (summarizing the Blackowiak holding: "The supreme court
ruled that evidence a plaintiff knows he or she was abused is equivalent to evi-
dence that the plaintiff knows the abuse caused injury.").
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court, subdivision 2 of the delayed discovery statute is only in-
tended to provide a six-year statute of limitations running from
the date of the abuse, rather than a six-year statute of limitations
running from the date that the victim realized that the abuse
caused his or her injury.63 By ignoring the fact that the six-year
statute of limitations runs "from the time the plaintiff knew or had
reason to know that the injury was caused by the sexual abuse,"64
the Blackowiak decision effectively removes the knowledge of cau-
sation element from the requirements for invocation of the delayed
discovery statute.65
C. Theories of Employer Liability
1. Respondeat Superior
The English translation of respondeat superior is "let the
master answer."66 In modern legal parlance, the phrase means
that "a master is liable in certain cases for the wrongful acts of his
servant ... "67 Legal historians do not agree on the origins of the
doctrine, 68 but plausible theories have dated it from Roman times
to seventeenth century England.69
63. Blackowiak, 546 N.W.2d at 3. The court noted that to interpret the statute
any other way "is to inject a wholly subjective inquiry into an individual's unique
circumstances." Id.
64. MINN. STAT. § 541.073 (1996).
65. Id.
66. BLACK'S LAW DICTIoNARY 1311 (6th ed. 1990).
67. Id. at 1311-12.
68. See James Fleming, Jr., Vicarious Liability, 28 TUL. L. REV. 161, 164
(1954).
69. Justice Holmes stated that vicarious liability stemmed from ancient law
which imposed liability on the head of a family for the acts of family members or
slaves. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Agency, 4 HARV. L. REV. 345, 350-351 (1891).
Holmes showed that the Roman praetor created liability on the part of masters
because "the act of the servant was the act of the master." Id. at 351. Holmes goes
on to show that public policy was a more significant force behind the praetor's de-
cision than logic, noting "the special confidence necessarily reposed in innkeepers."
Id. After its inception, the doctrine assumed a momentum of its own:
And the mere habit of using these phrases, where the master is bound or
benefited by his servant's act, makes it likely that other cases will be
brought within the penumbra of the same thought on no more substantial
ground than the way of thinking which the words have brought about.
Id.
Professor Wigmore wrote that vicarious liability descended from "the primitive
Germanic idea... that the master was to be held liable absolutely for harm done
by his slaves or servants." John H. Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its
History, 7 HARV. L. REV. 383, 383 (1894). The requirement of the master's com-
mand or consent did not appear until the early Anglo-Norman period. Id. at 383
n.2.
Lord Holt was primarily responsible for the transition of vicarious liability to a
200 [Vol. 15:191
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At the heart of respondeat superior claims is the "scope of
employment" test, that is, whether the employee's actions were
within the scope of his or her employment. 70 Every commentator
on the origins of vicarious liability agrees that Lord Holt is the
party responsible for the formalization of the scope of employment
test.7
1
Under the scope of employment test, liability is only imputed
to the employer if the employee's tortious actions were within the
scope of his or her employment. 72 The definition of "scope of em-
ployment," however, varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 73 This
doctrine based on public policy. Id. at 398 (noting in Wayland's case that "[ilt is
more reasonable that [the master] should suffer for the cheats of his servant than
strangers and tradesmen").
Holdsworth traced the idea of "noxal surrender" to early Anglo-Saxon law. 2
SIR WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 46 (4th ed. 1936). Noxal
surrender is the idea that a "guilty thing must be given up; and it is only if the
owner declines to give it up that he can be made liable." Id. This idea trans-
formed into a policy-based system of vicarious liability at the end of the seven-
teenth century. Fleming, supra note 68, at 165 (interpreting Holdsworth).
Baty described vicarious liability as "a veritable upas-tree ... [u]nknown to
the classical jurisprudence of Rome [and] unfamiliar to the mediaeval jurispru-
dence of England, it has attained its luxuriant growth through carelessness and
false analogy." T. BATY, VICARIOUS LIABILITY 7 (1916). Even he, however, ac-
knowledges the formalization of the scope of employment test by Lord Holt. Id. at
9.
70. See infra note 72 and accompanying text.
71. See Fleming, supra note 68, at 165. The "scope of employment" test was
promulgated in Hern v. Nichols, 1 Salk. 289 (1709). BATY, supra note 69, at 9.
72. The Second Restatement of Torts supports the "scope of employment" test:
§ 317. Duty of Master to Control Conduct of Servant
A master is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control his ser-
vant while acting outside the scope of his employment as to prevent him
from intentionally harming others or from so conducting himself as to
create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them, if
(a) the servant
(i) is upon the premises in possession of the master or upon which
the servant is privileged to enter only as his servant, or
(ii) is using a chattel of the master, and
(b) the master
(i) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control
his servant, and
(ii) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for ex-
ercising such control.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 317 (1965).
73. The elements of vicarious liability in the various states are similar to the
requirements of the Restatement. For example, in Utah, "there are three criteria
for imposing liability: the employee's conduct must be of the general kind the em-
ployee was hired to perform, it must occur within the hours and the spatial
boundaries of the employment, and it must be motivated, at least in part, to serve
the employer's interest." Id. (citing Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053,
1056-57 (Utah 1989)). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 (1958).
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variation is perhaps in part due to the numerous theories on the
doctrine's origin.74
One main aspect of respondeat superior sets it apart from
other doctrines creating employer liability. This aspect is that in-
tent or negligence on the part of the employer need not be proven
to find liability.75 Not all employee actions create employer liabil-
ity under respondeat superior, however, because not all employee
actions fall within the parameters of the employment relation-
ship.7 6 In Minnesota, for example, liability is only found when the
"source of the attack is related to the duties of the employee and
the assault occurs within work-related limits of time and place."77
Thus, if an employee's actions occur outside of the workplace, or at
a time when the employee is not working, liability under respon-
deat superior will not be found.78 This test of employer liability
has been utilized in the context of sexual assault crimes. 79
74. See supra note 69.
75. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
76. Id.
77. Lange v. National Biscuit Co., 211 N.W.2d 783 (Minn. 1973). The plaintiff
in Lange was a grocery store manager who got into an argument with a cookie
salesman over the salesman's servicing of the manager's store. Id. at 784. The
cookie salesman took umbrage and assaulted the store manager. Id. In holding
for the store manager, the Minnesota Supreme Court rejected the established test
for employer liability under respondeat superior, which required a showing that
the employee's acts were motivated by a desire to further the employer's business.
Id. The traditional criteria for respondeat superior would have precluded em-
ployer liability in Lange. Id. The court noted that liability for the employee's as-
sault in such cases could only be found "in those rare instances where the master
actually requested the servant to so perform, or the servant's duties were such
that that motivation was implied in law." Id. In the place of the established re-
spondeat superior test, the court held that an employer is liable when the "source
of the attack is related to the duties of the employee and the assault occurs within
work-related limits of time and place." Id. at 783. Since the cookie salesman's at-
tack was related to his duties and the assault occurred within work-related time
and place limits, the employer, National Biscuit Company, was found liable. Id.
78. See, e.g., Oslin v. State, 543 N.W.2d 408 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996). In Oslin,
an employee assaulted two of his co-workers at a Christmas party. Id. at 411. The
party was advertised at the workplace but was held at a local saloon. Id. at 414.
Noting that the employer did not contribute to the party in any manner, the Min-
nesota Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision that the party "did not
occur within the 'work-related limits of time and space."' Id. (citing Lange, 211
N.W.2d at 783). Accordingly, the employer was not liable for the acts of its em-
ployee. Id. at 413-14.
79. See Marston v. Minneapolis Clinic of Psychiatry & Neurology, Ltd., 329
N.W.2d 306 (Minn. 1982). In Marston, a psychiatrist used his position of authority
to kiss, fondle and massage one of his patients. Id. at 307. The Minnesota Su-
preme Court ruled that whether the psychiatrist's actions were within the scope of
his employment was a question of fact. Id. at 311.
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The modern rationale for respondeat superior frames the doc-
trine as a form of enterprise liability.80 The enterprise liability
theory "allocates the risk of the servant's negligence to the master,
not because he is at fault, but because he is normally in a better
position than the servant to respond in damages."8' In addition,
the employer "is better able than the victim to spread the risk by
treating third-party liability as a cost of doing business."8 2 In ef-
fect, respondeat superior marks a conscious determination to
transfer the financial burden of a tort to the employer.
8 3
Numerous justifications have been posited for this transfer.84
One of the most important reasons is that respondeat superior
provides an increased chance of adequate compensation for victims
by providing an additional source of funding.85 In addition, re-
spondeat superior ensures that losses will be equitably distributed
among the beneficiaries of the enterprises which incur them.
86
While these rationales are different, they have a common charac-
teristic: liability exists not because of fault, but because it is justi-
fied by public policy.
2. Other Theories of Employer Liability
In situations where the employer's negligence can be proven,
Minnesota allows liability to be imputed to the employer through
three doctrines other than respondeat superior: negligent hiring,
8 7
80. See, e.g., South Carolina Ins. Co. v. James C. Greene & Co., 348 S.E.2d 617,
623 (S.C. Ct. App. 1986).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 623-24.
83. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 69,
at 500 (5th ed. 1984).
84. Rhett B. Franklin, Pouring New Wine into an Old Bottle.- A Recommenda-
tion for Determining Liability of an Employer Under Respondeat Superior, 39 S.D.
L. REV. 575-76 (1994).
85. Id. at 575.
86. Id. at 575-76.
87. Minnesota recognizes the tort of negligent hiring. See, e.g., Ponticas v.
K.M.S. Investments, 331 N.W.2d 907, 911 (Minn. 1983) (holding that an employer
is liable for negligent hiring if the employer places "a person with known propensi-
ties, or propensities which should have been discovered by reasonable investiga-
tion, in an employment position in which, because of the circumstances of the em-
ployment, it should have been foreseeable that the hired individual posed a threat
of injury to others."). Id. In Ponticas, a resident manager of an apartment com-
plex who was on parole for aggravated robbery, burglary and theft used a passkey
to enter a tenant's apartment and rape her at knife point. Id. at 909. The Minne-
sota Court of Appeals held that "the scope of the duty is commensurate with the
risks of the situation." Id. at 912. The high degree of public contact inherent in
the resident manager position, by dint of the passkey, warranted a high degree of
care in selecting individuals to fulfill that position. Id. at 913. The apartment
complex managers violated that duty by failing to adequately investigate the em-
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negligent supervision 88 and negligent retention.89 Negligent hiring
imputes liability to an employer who fails to conduct a background
check appropriate to the level of public contact a job involves. 90
Liability for negligent retention arises when the employer becomes
aware of "dangerous factors" in a person's employment and fails to
take appropriate remedial action.9 1 Negligent supervision is de-
ployee's criminal background before giving him the job. Id. at 914.
88. Negligent supervision is derived from respondeat superior and was first
discussed in Minnesota in Semrad v. Edina Realty, Inc., 493 N.W.2d 528, 534
(Minn. 1992). Plaintiff based this cause of action on the "Duty of Master to Control
Conduct of Servant," RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 317 (1965). Id. In Sent-
rad, a group of investors sued Edina Realty to recover money lost through dealings
with one of its sales associates. Id. at 529. The Minnesota Supreme Court held
that negligent supervision could not be applied to investment situations because
the entire thrust of section 317 is directed at an employer's duty to control
his or her employee's physical conduct while on the employer's premises
or while using the employer's chattels, even when the employee is acting
outside the scope of the employment, in order to prevent intentional or
negligent infliction of personal injury.
Id. at 534. In dicta, however, the court went further to limit the use of negligent
supervision to "a duty to prevent an employee from inflicting personal injury upon
a third person on the master's premises or to prevent the infliction of bodily harm
by use or misuse of the employer's chattels." Id. Section 317 creates a three-
element test for negligent supervision: (1) the servant must either be on the
premises or using a chattel of the master, (2) the master must know or have rea-
son to know that he has the ability to control the servant and (3) the master knows
or should know of the need and opportunity to exercise control. Id.
89. Minnesota recognized the tort of negligent retention in Yunker v. Honey-
well, 496 N.W.2d 419 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993). Honeywell employed Randy Landin
from 1977 to 1979 and from 1984 to 1988. Id. at 421. Landin's employment was
interrupted by a prison sentence which he incurred for strangling one of his co-
workers to death. Id. at 420-21. Upon his release, Landin was rehired by Honey-
well in a custodial capacity and was transferred twice because of workplace con-
frontations. Id. at 421. Landin began to threaten and harass a co-worker, Nesser,
after she did not reciprocate his romantic interest. Id. These threats reached
their apex when Landin scratched the message "one more day and you're dead"
onto Nesser's locker door. Id. at 421, 424. Using a shotgun fired at close range,
Landin carried out his threat less than three weeks after he made it. Id. at 421.
Recognizing that Nesser's heirs did not have a cause of action under either
negligent hiring or respondeat superior, the Minnesota Court of Appeals promul-
gated the tort of negligent retention. Id. at 423. The court accepted the following
description: "[n]egligent retention ... occurs when, during the course of employ-
ment, the employer becomes aware or should have become aware of problems with
an employee that indicated his unfitness, and the employer fails to take further
action such as investigating, discharge, or reassignment." Id. (quoting Garcia v.
Duffy, 492 So. 2d 435, 438-39 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)).
90. Ponticas, 331 N.W.2d at 911.
91. Yunker, 496 N.W.2d at 423. Yunker is the most recent in a line of Minne-
sota cases beginning with Dean v. St. Paul Union Depot Co., 43 N.W. 54 (Minn.
1889). Dean was a negligence action by a plaintiff who was beaten by the defen-
dant's ill-tempered employee. Id. at 55. In holding for the plaintiff, the Minnesota
Supreme Court reasoned that the employer "had no more right ... to knowingly
and advisedly employ ... a dangerous and vicious man, than it would have to keep
and harbor a dangerous and savage dog." Id.
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rived from respondeat superior 92 and imposes liability on the em-
ployer for the actions of employees when they occur on the em-
ployer's property and the employer knows or should know of the
offense. 93 Unlike some jurisdictions, Minnesota has refused to
merge negligent hiring and negligent retention into a single tort.94
Negligent hiring, retention and supervision differ from re-
spondeat superior in that liability under respondeat superior is not
contingent upon a finding of negligence. 95 Instead, respondeat su-
perior liability is based primarily on the existence of an employ-
ment relationship. 96 In contrast, negligent hiring, retention and
supervision all require a showing of negligence on the part of the
employer. 97 For the victim of sex abuse who does not become
aware of an injury until years after it occurred, this showing may
be difficult or impossible to make. 98 Therefore, respondeat supe-
rior is a better cause of action for victims of sexual abuse.
II. The Oelschlager Decision
While Roe and Blackowiak limit the amount of time in which
the delayed discovery statute may be used, the Oelschlager deci-
sion limits the reach of the delayed discovery statute by eliminat-
ing delayed discovery respondeat superior claims.99 Redeemer,
Magnuson's employer, argued in Oelschlager that it was not liable
for Magnuson's conduct because the statute of limitations had run
on the appellant's respondeat superior claim, and because Magnu-
son was acting outside the scope of his employment as a matter of
law when he abused Oelschlager. 100 The trial court rejected these
arguments and found liability under respondeat superior. 1° 1 Re-
deemer appealed the decision, 0 2 and the Minnesota Court of Ap-
peals reversed, reasoning that respondeat superior claims fell out-
side the scope of the delayed discovery statute. 103 Accordingly,
92. See M.L. v. Magnuson, 531 N.W.2d 849, 853 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
93. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
94. See, e.g., Ponticas v. K.M.S. Investments, 331 N.W.2d at 910.
95. See supra note 72.
96. Id.
97. See supra notes 87-89.
98. Gary M. Ernsdorff & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Let Sleeping Memories Lie?
Words of Caution About Tolling the Statute of Limitations in Cases of Memory Re-
pression, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 129, 141 (recognizing the difficulty of ob-
taining reliable evidence after the passage of time).
99. Oelschlager v. Magnuson, 528 N.W.2d 895, 901 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
100. Id. at 898.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 903.
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Oelschlager's claim was barred by the six year statute of limita-
tions in subdivision 3 of the delayed discovery statute. 0
4
In interpreting the delayed discovery statute, the Court of
Appeals noted that although the goal of statutory interpretation is
to "ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature,"'10 5 the
plain meaning of the statute cannot be disregarded. 10 6 The court
found that the plain meaning of subdivision 3 of the statute, which
states that delayed discovery only applies against those who com-
mit sexual abuse and those who negligently permit sexual abuse to
occur, meant that the delayed discovery statute does not apply to
respondeat superior claims. 0 7 This holding was based on the fact
that liability under respondeat superior is not predicated on a
finding of negligence. 08
The court rejected the trial court's determination that subdi-
vision 3 can be read to mean 'but is not limited to' the enumerated
causes of action" by reasoning that subdivision 2(a) encompasses
all "action[s] for damages based on personal injury caused by sex-
ual abuse."'0 9 This holding forced the Court of Appeals to disre-
gard its own precedent establishing that the statute of limitations
for a respondeat superior claim is usually the same as that for the
primary cause of action." 0  Oelschlager's respondeat superior
claim was then rejected as untimely under Minnesota's standard
statute of limitations for personal injury actions."'
The Minnesota Court of Appeals clarified the rationale be-
hind the Oelschlager decision in Sarafolean v. Kauffman." 2 The
trial court in Sarafolean granted summary judgment to a defen-
dant employer based on Oelschlager's holding that the delayed dis-
covery statute does not apply to respondeat superior claims. 1 3 On
appeal, the court noted that: "[p]olicy supports such an interpreta-
tion, under which the actual perpetrators and facilitators of sexual
abuse are more easily held liable, but institutions, which are not
directly responsible for the abuse, remain protected by the normal
limitations period.""14
104. Id. at 901.
105. MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (1996).
106. Oelschlager, 528 N.W.2d at 901.
107. Id.
108. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
109. Id.
110. See Kaiser v. Memorial Blood Ctr. of Minneapolis, 486 N.W.2d 762, 767
(Minn. 1992) (citing Grondahl v. Bulluck, 318 N.W.2d 240, 244 (Minn. 1982)).
111. Oelschlager, 528 N.W.2d at 902.





III. The Oelschlager Court Should Have Interpreted the
Delayed Discovery Statute to Include Respondeat
Superior Claims
The Oelschlager court used a plain-meaning argument to
show that the delayed discovery statute was not designed to ex-
tend the statute of limitations for respondeat superior claims. 115
Examination of the Oelschlager court's logic, however, reveals that
its interpretation is not dictated by the plain meaning of the de-
layed discovery statute, and is contrary to legislative intent. Pub-
lic policy is not served by the Oelschlager decision. In addition, in-
clusion of respondeat superior within the causes of action affected
by the delayed discovery statute creates a more logically consistent
system under the delayed discovery statute than the scheme cre-
ated by Oelschlager. Finally, the inclusion of respondeat superior
aligns the interpretation of the delayed discovery statute with the
similarly phrased Washington delayed discovery statute.
A. The Delayed Discovery Statute May Be Interpreted to
Include Respondeat Superior Claims
The Minnesota Court of Appeals found that subdivision 3 of
the delayed discovery statute does not encompass respondeat su-
perior claims. 1 6 The rationale behind this holding was that
"reading subdivision 3 as merely illustrative [of section 2(a)] ...
would make the subdivision redundant."117 Under Minn. Stat.
§ 645.16, courts are required to eliminate redundancy by constru-
ing statutes, when possible, to give effect to all of their provi-
sions.118
While the goal of efficient statutory interpretation is laud-
able, the Oelschlager court's holding that subdivision 3's applica-
tion of the delayed discovery statute controls subdivision 2(a)'s six-
year limitation period does not achieve that aspiration. The
court's solution only serves to modify the redundancy. Instead of
subdivision 3 being subordinate to subdivision 2(a), the Oelsch-
lager decision causes subdivision 2(a) to subordinate subdivision 3.
This result is every bit as confusing as the interpretive situation
prior to Oelschlager. This highlights the real problem with the
delayed discovery statute: the intended scope of the statute cannot
be determined only from its text.
115. Oelschlager, 528 N.W.2d at 901.
116. Id. at 901-02.
117. Id.
118. MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (1996).
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The Oelschlager court failed to recognize this problem.
Where there is an obvious contradiction within a statute, as is the
case with the delayed discovery statute, legislative intent should
be examined to determine how the statute should be interpreted.
The Oelschlager court did not examine legislative intent. Instead,
the court held that the plain meaning of the statute excluded re-
spondeat superior claims from the scope of the delayed discovery
statute." 9
If the Oelschlager court had examined legislative intent, it
would have discovered that the intent of the legislature was to
provide victims using the delayed discovery statute with the use of
respondeat superior. 120 The substantial similarity between the
text of the Minnesota and Washington delayed discovery statutes
suggests that the intent of the Minnesota legislature was to make
the same causes of action available under the Minnesota statute.
121
In addition, the statute of limitations for respondeat superior is
typically the same as the statute of limitations for the underlying
cause of action.122 The Minnesota legislature expressed no inten-
tion to vary from this principle.
123
B. Public Policy Requires the Admission of Respondeat
Superior
The Oelschlager decision is also contrary to public policy. In
excluding respondeat superior from the scope of the delayed dis-
covery statute, the Oelschlager court shielded employers from
damage and settlement payments which might otherwise have re-
sulted from delayed discovery litigation. This decision by the court
all but ignored the modern justification for respondeat superior.
The modern doctrine of respondeat superior compensates vic-
tims for the wrongs perpetrated against them. 124 Liability is im-
119. Oelschlager, 528 N.W.2d at 901.
120. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
121. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
122. Other Minnesota cases have held that, usually, the statute of limitations
for a respondeat superior claim is the same as that for the underlying cause of ac-
tion. See Kaiser v. Memorial Blood Ctr. of Minneapolis, 486 N.W.2d 762, 767
(Minn. 1992) (citing Grondahl v. Bulluck, 318 N.W.2d 240, 244 (Minn. 1982)). The
Minnesota Court of Appeals took note of this fact in Oelschlager, but did not find
that information dispositive. Oelschlager, 528 N.W.2d at 902. Respondeat supe-
rior claims are permitted when a sexual abuse claim is brought under Minnesota's
two-year statute of limitations. See, e.g., Winkler v. Magnuson, 539 N.W.2d 821
(Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that a sexual abuse victim's claim was time-barred
under the two-year statute of limitations governing battery claims).
123. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
124. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
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puted for two principal reasons: the tortfeasor is often unable to
adequately compensate the victim, 125 and employer liability is an
efficient mechanism through which to transfer the cost of the tort
to society at large.126 In the case of Oelschlager, it is extremely
unlikely that any meaningful financial recovery would ever be had
from Magnuson, who was the target of numerous published sex
abuse cases and an untold number of settlements.127 Employer li-
ability allows a victim who would otherwise go uncompensated to
receive financial compensation. 128 Through insurance, the price of
this compensation is borne by society as a whole. 129
Although these policy reasons suggest that respondeat supe-
rior should be included in the scope of the delayed discovery stat-
ute, the Oelschlager court refused to do so. The court did not posit
a countervailing policy reason for its refusal to allow sex abuse vic-
tims to recover under respondeat superior.130 Accordingly, public
policy requires that respondeat superior be included within the
scope of the delayed discovery statute.
The need to include respondeat superior claims under the
delayed discovery statute is apparent from the inadequacy of the
remaining causes of action available to sex abuse victims. Negli-
gent hiring, negligent retention and negligent supervision are all
useful causes of action in their own right,' 3 ' but they do not pro-
vide compensation to the sex abuse victim who is unable to prove
employer negligence or intent.
Problems of proof are especially prevalent within the context
of delayed discovery. 132 Because of the amount of time required for
the consequences of sexual abuse to manifest, delayed discovery
actions are always brought at least two years after the last inci-
125. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
127. E.g., Winkler, 539 N.W.2d at 821; M.L. v. Magnuson, 531 N.W.2d 849
(Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
128. The ease by which the liability of employers under respondeat superior can
be transferred to society at large is readily seen in the availability of sex abuse
litigation indemnification policies offered to churches and other institutions likely
to employ sex abusers. See, e.g., Diocese of Winona v. Interstate Fire and Cas. Co.,
841 F. Supp. 894 (D. Minn. 1992) (describing the Diocese's three-layer insurance
program for protection against sex abuse claims).
129. Franklin, supra note 84, at 575 n.40.
130. The justification of the court in Sarafolean v. Kauffman, 547 N.W.2d 417
(Minn. Ct. App. 1996), that only the direct perpetrators of sexual abuse should be
subject to an extended statute of limitations was not posited by the Oelschlager
court and has no basis in the legislative history of the delayed discovery statute.
See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 87-89.
132. Ernsdorff & Loftus, supra note 98, at 141.
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dent of sexual abuse. 133 In the intervening time, the recollections
and records needed to prove negligence grow dim and are mis-
placed.134 Only respondeat superior, which imputes liability with-
out proof of negligence, is likely to be capable of overcoming the
hurdles posed by the lengthy passage of time.
As further proof that public policy requires respondeat supe-
rior to be included within the scope of delayed discovery, the Min-
nesota Supreme Court's recent Blackowiak decision alleviates the
Oelschlager court's concern that permitting respondeat superior
claims allows plaintiffs an unlimited number of years to pursue a
claim. Under Blackowiak, the maximum interval between the
time that a victim becomes aware that they were sexually abused
and the time they file suit is six years. 135 Six years is a relatively
short span of time, and it seems unlikely that evidence will become
so distorted during that time that defendants need the further pro-
tection of respondeat superior exclusion.
C Including Respondeat Superior Within the Scope of the
Delayed Discovery Statute Increases Its Ideological
Consistency
1. By the Oelschlager Standard of Review, Negligent
Hiring, Negligent Retention and Negligent Supervision
Should Be Excluded from the Scope of the Delayed
Discovery Statute
In excluding respondeat superior, the Oelschlager court noted
that negligence claims were still available to the plaintiff under
the delayed discovery statute. 3 6 These causes of action are per-
mitted under the delayed discovery statute, despite the fact that
they are not specifically mentioned in the statute and that the
"plain meaning" of subdivision 3 would seem to allow only a com-
mon-law negligence claim. 13 7 Adherence to the standard of statu-
tory interpretation used to reject respondeat superior, however,
133. Plaintiffs who bring suit within two years use a standard personal injury
claim. MINN. STAT. § 541.07 (1996) (providing two year statute of limitations for
personal injury claims).
134. Ernsdorff & Loftus, supra note 98, at 141.
135. Blackowiak v. Kemp, 546 N.W.2d 1, 3 (IMinn. 1996).
136. Oelschlager v. Magnuson, 528 N.W.2d 895, 902 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995)
("Eliminating Redeemer's liability under respondeat superior leaves negligence as
Redeemer's sole source of liability.").
137. MINN. STAT. § 541.073 (1996). See, e.g., M.L. v. Magnuson, 531 N.W.2d 849
(Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (rejecting the use of a general negligence jury instruction,




results in a similar exclusion of these three torts. The operative
language of subdivision 3 of the delayed discovery statute provides
a cause of action only against parties charged with "negligently
permitting sexual abuse."'138 To maintain a consistent level of judi-
cial scrutiny, this phrase should be read to permit a general negli-
gence claim. "Negligently permitting sexual abuse"139 is not a
catch-all phrase for the separate torts of negligent hiring, negli-
gent retention, and negligent supervision. By the Oelschlager
court's own logic, if the legislature wished to extend negligent
hiring, negligent retention and negligent supervision to the de-
layed discovery arena, it would have explicitly listed those causes
of action.
The legislature did not, however, specifically list these causes
of action. If the Minnesota Court of Appeals is to maintain its
status as an interpreter of legislative intent and not a creator of
legislation, the same level of judicial scrutiny should be main-
tained throughout a single statutory interpretation. There are two
possibilities for consistent interpretations: respondeat superior
can be included along with negligent hiring, retention and super-
vision, or all four causes of action can be excluded. Obviously, the
latter choice renders the delayed discovery statute devoid of
meaning. Accordingly, only the inclusion of respondeat superior is
a valid interpretation.
2. The Curious Case of Negligent Supervision
The Oelschlager decision is also inconsistent because the
Court of Appeals failed to address whether negligent supervision
claims should be excluded from the context of delayed discovery
when it excluded claims based on respondeat superior. 140 In fact,
the court affirmatively allowed a negligent supervision claim in a
follow-up case. 14 1 These decisions are remarkable because negli-
138. MINN. STAT. § 541.073 (3) (1996).
139. MINN. STAT. § 541.073 (3).
140. Oelschlager, 528 N.W.2d at 902.
141. M.L., 531 N.W.2d at 856-58. The Minnesota Court of Appeals wrote that
"[niegligent supervision derives from the doctrine of respondeat superior so the
claimant must prove that the employee's actions occurred within the scope of em-
ployment in order to succeed on this claim." Id. at 858 (citing Cook v. Greyhound
Lines, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 725, 732 (D. Minn. 1994)). This assertion is an incorrect
interpretation of the Minnesota respondeat superior test as promulgated in Lange
v. National Biscuit Co., 211 N.W.2d 783 (Minn. 1973). The Lange court stated that
a respondeat superior claim in Minnesota need only be related to employment du-
ties and occur "within work-related limits of time and place." 211 N.W.2d at 783.
See supra note 77.
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gent supervision is derived from respondeat superior. 142 By per-
mitting negligent supervision while excluding its predecessor, the
Court of Appeals has created a manifest doctrinal inconsistency.
There is no simple way for the Court of Appeals to reconcile
its holdings on respondeat superior in Oelschlager and negligent
supervision in Seinrad. In order to make the decisions consistent,
the court's first option is simply to ban negligent supervision along
with respondeat superior. Excluding negligent supervision, how-
ever, is patently inconsistent with other Court of Appeals cases
and the plain meaning of the delayed discovery statute, which spe-
cifically states that it "applies to an action for damages commenced
against a person who caused the plaintiffs personal injury [by]
negligently permitting sexual abuse . . ".,"143 The court's second
option, and clearly the better one, is to reverse the Oelschlager de-
cision.
3. Including Respondeat Superior Within the Scope of
Minnesota's Delayed Discovery Statute Aligns It with
Washington's Delayed Discovery Statute
The Minnesota legislature based its delayed discovery statute
on the text of the Washington delayed discovery statute. 4 4 While
no Washington case specifically endorsed the use of respondeat
superior within the context of delayed discovery, 145 this absence is
best explained by the inclusive language of the Washington de-
layed discovery statute, which includes "[a]ll claims or causes of
action based on intentional conduct. ."... 146 In the context of sex-
ual abuse, respondeat superior claims, which are based on the tor-
tious conduct of the defendant's employee, are clearly "based on
intentional conduct."147
The Minnesota House and Senate subcommittees which un-
dertook the task of drafting the delayed discovery statute made no
mention of the fact that the Washington statute encompasses re-
spondeat superior claims. 148 Where one statute borrows most of its
language from another, the statutes should be interpreted in a
142. See supra note 88.
143. MINN. STAT. § 541.073 (1996). For the full statutory text, see supra text
accompanying note 10.
144. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
145. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
146. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.16.340 (West 1996).
147. A question of redundancy is raised in Washington's use of the phrase
"intentional conduct" in the context of childhood sexual abuse, as it is hard to
imagine a scenario where sexual abuse of a child was negligent.
148. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
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similar manner. This is especially true when there is no specific
mention of a change by the drafters of the second statute. Ac-
cordingly, the two laws should endorse the same causes of action.
The Oelschlager court's decision to exclude respondeat superior
causes Minnesota's delayed discovery statute to encompass very
different causes of action from those encompassed by the similarly
worded Washington statute.
IV. Respondeat Superior Inclusion Is a Better Solution
In Oelschlager, the Minnesota Court of Appeals treats the is-
sue of whether to include respondeat superior within the scope of
the delayed discovery statute as if it were the final determinant of
liability. That is not the case. Allowing respondeat superior
claims under the delayed discovery statute allows the claim to be
determined on its merits. This determination can be made by fol-
lowing the Lange-Marston test for respondeat superior liability. 149
Simply put, liability is assigned to the employer only if the em-
ployee/intentional tortfeasor was "within work-related limits of
time and place," and the tortious action was related to but not nec-
essarily in furtherance of the employee's employment. 150 This
standard is far from strict liability for all sex abusers.
After the Oelschlager trial court found that Magnuson acted
within the scope of his employment, the respondent in Oelschlager
raised the issue of whether Magnuson was outside the scope of his
employment according to the Marston test. 151 This defense was
not considered because relevant sections of the trial transcript
were not filed. 152 Consequently, whether Magnuson acted within
the limits established by Marston cannot be determined. It is safe
to state, however, that if the Marston test is adopted by the Court
of Appeals within the context of delayed discovery, the liability of
Magnuson's employer would be determined on its merits and not
by judicial fiat.
Conclusion
The Minnesota Court of Appeals committed an injustice in re-
fusing to include the doctrine of respondeat superior within the
scope of the delayed discovery statute. The Court's decision was
not dictated by statutory text and is contrary to both legislative in-
149. For description of the tests, see supra notes 77, 79.
150. Id.
151. Oelschlager v. Magnuson, 528 N.W.2d 895, 902 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
152. Id. at 903.
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tent and public policy. Because of the Oelschlager decision, survi-
vors of sexual abuse whom the delayed discovery statute was de-
signed to assist are routinely deprived of financial recovery. By
barring recovery, the financial cost of the abuse is borne by the
party least deserving the burden: the victim.
This assessment of the jurisprudence surrounding the de-
layed discovery statute is hardly sensationalist, as can be seen by
the divisions within the Court of Appeals caused by delayed dis-
covery. In KB. v. Evangelical Lutheran Church,153 one of the most
recent in the line of cases rejecting the claims of sex abuse victims
without reaching their merits, a dissenting Judge Amundson
154
was inspired to quote Martin Luther:
[I]t is conscience which calls me to dissent. And I recall viv-
idly being taught the virtues of fidelity to conscience. Perhaps
these parties will understand that better than any others. My
lesson comes from a 16th century monk who truculently defied
all known religious and secular authorities of the time when
he declared:
Unless I am proved wrong... by right reason I cannot
recant. To do so would require me to offend my con-
science, and to do that is neither wise nor safe. Here I
stand; I cannot do otherwise. 155
The Court of Appeals would do well to take note of Judge
Amundson's dissent and consider the practical implications of the
Oelschlager decision on the survivors of sexual abuse.
153. 538 N.W.2d 152 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
154. Judge Amundson was also the only judge to realize that the Court of Ap-
peals' plain language interpretation of § 541.073 in Roe v. Archdiocese of St. Paul,
518 N.W.2d 629 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (Amundson, J., concurring), rev. denied
(Minn. Aug. 24, 1994), would effectively destroy the usefulness of the statute. Id.
155. K.B., 538 N.W.2d at 158 (Amundson, J., dissenting) (quoting MARTIN
LUTHER, DIET OF WORMs, April 18, 1521).
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